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PRELUDE: ON MAKING JAVANESE TOBACCO IN A
JAPANESE POW CAMP:

'It's not bad at all....'
'How the hell do you do it?'
'Trade secret.'
The King knew he had a gold mine in his hands. 'I guess it's a long
and involved process,' he said delicately.
'Oh, actually it's quite easy. You just soak the raw weed in tea, then
squeeze it out. Then you sprinkle a little white sugar over it and knead
it in, and when it's all absorbed, cook it gently in a frying pan over a
low heat. Keep turning it over or it'll spoil. You've got to get it just
right. Not too dry and not too moist.'
The King was surprisedthat Peter Marlowe had told him the process
so easily - without making a deal first. Of course, he thought, he's just
whetting my appetite. Can't be that easy or everyone'd be doing it.
And he probably knows I'm the only one who could handle the deal.
'Just like that?' the King said smiling.
'Yes. Nothing to it really.'
The King could see a thriving business. Legitimate too....
* . 'Then you're the only one who knows how to do it!'
'Oh no,' said Peter Marlowe and the King's heart sank. 'It's a native
custom. They do it all over Java.'
The King brightened. 'But no one here knows about it, do they?'
'I don't know. I've never really thought about it.'
The King let the smoke dribble out of his nostrils and his mind
worked rapidly. Oh yes, he told himself, this is my lucky day.
t Fellow, Liberty Fund, Inc.; JD, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (2006);
MA (economics), The New School for Social Research (2005); BS, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (2001).
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'Tell you what, Peter. I got a businesspropositionfor you. You show
me exactly how to do it, and I'll cut you in for-'He hesitated. 'Ten
percent.'
'What?'
'All right. Twenty-five.'
'Twenty-five?'
'All right,' the King said, looking at Peter Marlowe with new respect.
'You're a hard trader and that's great. I'll organize the whole deal.
We'll buy in bulk. We'll have to set up a factory. You can oversee production and I'll look after sales.' He stuck out his hand. 'We'll be partners - split right down the middle, fifty-fifty. It's a deal.'
'Oh no it's not!'...
'Sixty-forty, and I've never offered that to anyone in my life.
Sixty-forty it is.'
'No it isn't.'.

'I don't want anything,' said Peter Marlowe.

'Nothing?' The King sat down feebly, wrecked.
Peter Marlowe was bewildered. 'You know,' he said hesitantly, 'I
don't understand why you get so excited about certain things. The process isn't mine to sell. It's a simple native custom. I couldn't possibly
take anything from you. That wouldn't be right. Not at all. And anyway, I-' Peter Marlowe stopped and said quickly, 'Would you like me
to show you now?'
'Just a minute. You mean to tell me you want nothing for showing
me the process? When I've offered to split sixty-forty with you? When
I tell you I can make money out of the deal?' Peter Marlowe nodded.
'That's crazy,' the King said helplessly. 'It's wrong. I don't
understand.1
INTRODUCTION

Approaching the debate over indigenous intellectual property rights
strikes one coming to it recently as perhaps all too similar to this fictitious2 exchange between friends. The debate seems to be one populated by both King Rats and Peter Marlowes, each frequently talking
past rather than to one another, taking so obvious and uncontroversial
their own position that they fail to see any value, or even the existence, of the other's. How, then, are we to make any sense of what is
at stake and what the right answers are? First, we should ask the most
basic questions and seek to answer them. Only then can we begin to
address specific claims. To understand the consequences of granting
or denying intellectual property protection to indigenous peoples for
any sort of knowledge or product, we must first have some notion of
1. JAMES CLAVELL, KING RAT 46-47 (Hodder ed.) (1962).
2. KING RAT is, however, widely taken to be the most profoundly autobiographical of Clavell's work, so perhaps this or a similar conversation did occur. John Simpson, introduction to James Clovell, King Rat, 4-7 (Hodder ed.) (1962).
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the nature, scope, and origin of such a right. In other words, we must
understand the underlying claim before we can understand, extend, or
create a legal action.
Of course, even Peter Marlowe isn't an advocate for the indigenous
groups so much as he is simply neutral as to the existence of a claim of
property at all, or at least such a claim by an outsider. Do the Javanese have a right to the sale of the tobacco? Tentatively, I would say
no, or at least not an absolute right. However, the Javanese do have a
strong advantage, as the source of the product and method, if they
wanted to directly market or license the tobacco as "official" Javanese
tobacco of some sort. And contemporary trademark and unfair competition law would then allow them to enjoin others from "passing
off" other products as authentic. This particular example is also interesting because we learn that the custom is widely known and used. A
more difficult case might involve a practice that only a small subset of
Javanese knew, and Peter Marlowe had learned from this smaller
group. Knowledge intended to be protected might rightfully be
treated differently from knowledge that is normally disseminated
widely within a community.
We may start by asking some very general questions. To whom
should the profits of collective knowledge attain? Does anyone have
a right to the profits of collective knowledge? An essential aspect of
physical (real and personal) property is its rivalrous nature - that my
use precludes yours. Law makes use of knowledge rivalrous by fiat
even where it is not actually the case; intellectual property law provides a method of exerting a claim over the use of the knowledge (in
print for copyright, trade for trademark, or production and service for
patent, for instance), even where not literally exclusive. Although my
use of your copy of a novel precludes your simultaneous use of it, I
may borrow your book. In that way knowledge is locked away from
any other individual only insofar as its particular physical embodiment
can be controlled, but the knowledge itself can be almost viral in its
spreading throughout communities. Yet in today's electronic world I
can easily make exact copies of your (digital) books, rendering our
mutual possession of a "single" (or original) copy truly nonrivalrous,
although we may dispute the propriety of my doing so.
Law makes the property metaphor for knowledge into reality and
affords correlative rights and remedies. By creating a set of laws that
either recognize or create a class of protections called "intellectual
property," the law has, for good or ill, endogenously influenced our
very understanding about the nature of knowledge. Instead of thinking of knowledge as information, which is naturally disseminated
across as many people as possible,3 we have come to view knowledge
3. John Cross, Address at the Texas Wesleyan Law Review Symposium: Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 24, 2008).
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as a type of property-somethingsubject to a set of rules, if negotiable
ones, controlling, not encouraging, its use by others. But even biological diversity can be understood as a type of information system, naturally disseminated through the world.'
Instead of asserting some abstract, moral right5 over use and dissemination of your ideas, intellectual property law affords a bundle of
rights to the creator, concretizing under the law what began as merely
an idea. I do not here render an opinion on the larger questions of the
justifications for intellectual property, but this larger context is especially important to keep in mind in the case of indigenous intellectual
property rights, which by their codification either create new rights or
expand existing intellectual property protections.
In any context, however, rights are useful because, but only insofar
as, they can be enforced to remedy problems caused by their not being
honored. That is, a right becomes meaningful only when it vests and I
may invoke it, either on my own or under the authority of law, to
resolve a conflict. "Rights are not necessarily self-enforcing." 6 The
limits of enforcement ultimately determine the boundaries of the right
itself. Because of its enforceability, we often talk of property as a
right, or as a bundle of rights. 7 Although the law in the United States
and many other jurisdictions widely recognize intellectual property,
information rights, broadly construed, are not well protected.8 Even
an individual's right to privacy, which many Americans cherish and
involves in many instances the control and access to information,
arises not from the text of the US Constitution but, famously, from its

4. Jim Chen, There's No Such Thing as Biopiracy... And It's a Good Thing Too,
36 McGEORGE L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
5. I am, of course, using the term "moral right" outside of its specialized meaning
in the context of copyright law, which extends the concept of intellectual property to
include control over uses of the physical embodiment of an idea, especially for unique
works of which there is only one copy, in contrast to the "first sale doctrine" which,
for instance, allows a consumer to do whatever they wish with a copy of a book.
Here, and throughout this essay, I will use the term "moral right" to refer to a claim
of a right that has its origins in moral philosophy as opposed to law.
6. LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 161

(1987).
7. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57

AMERICAN

ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967), available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/1821637.

8. Adam Moore would extend his Lockean account of intellectual property to
information, generally. ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INFORMATION CONTROL: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 117
(2001). "What is objectionable with the theft and pirating... of digital information is
that in most cases a right to the control of value or the value of control has been
violated without justification." Id. at 117. "I have argued ... information ... can be
owned and restricted on grounds of property or privacy." Id. at 192-93 (emphasis
added).
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"penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance." 9
Contemporary issues in intellectual property (or para-IP ° ) exacerbate concerns about thp r;- + t3 ,i,trol knowledge. If one is con-

%,cn
ea about personal information appearing in their entry on
Wikipedia, they can certainly edit certain parts out, but someone else
will likely put it right back in the entry, often adding cites to periodicals or other websites that corroborate the information. What kind of
rights are at stake in that example? Generally, no individual has the
right to control the dissemination of all facts, even if contested, about

their life," although they may have claims to restrict the dissemination of particular facts. Such claims, however, have traditionally been
based on a claim to privacy to be successful, not property."
If claims to protect knowledge about and of individuals are, at best,
dubious or unclear, what is to be made, then, of claims regarding collective knowledge? Can such knowledge possibly be private? If individuals possess little right to control information, is a group's claim to
control and use information stronger or weaker? If knowledge is a

type of property, collective knowledge is, at most, a type of commons,

replete with the well-known problems of commons,' 3 and likely with
at least a few additional challenges arising from its non-physical na-

ture, especially in justifying the right having been acquired by "morally arbitrary" original acquisition. 4
Philosopher Adam Moore recognized this problem from a rather
different perspective. Moore is arguing for a much stronger conception of intellectual property than the law currently provides for, and
he is, understandably, largely arguing against a collective ownership

argument, and thus points out that collective ownership, like individ9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also MOORE, supra
note 8, for an argument articulating the intersection or complementariness of privacy
and property in the context of information.
10. "Para-IP" is sometimes used to refer to legal protections not clearly part of the
conventional classifications of IP (copyright, trademark, and patent), yet cognate to
or emanating from those bodies of law, including aspects of cyberlaw, right of publicity, and likely applicable to certain aspects of the claims of indigenous peoples to
protect elements of their culture.
11. See Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (denying an injunction resulting from Howard Hughes' purchasing the publishers of magazine articles used in a forthcoming biography of him in an attempt to preclude the
publication of that biography by exerting control over the copyrighted content of the
magazines).
12. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET

(2007) for a thorough discussion of the issues surrounding

privacy in the context of the internet.
13. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
for the seminal contemporary exposition of the commons problem, available at http://
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/162/3859/1243.pdf.
14. MOORE, supra note 8, at 107.
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ual ownership, faces the problem of justifying original acquisition. 5
This posture of Moore's raising this particular point about the need to
justify original acquisition for the individual or the collective is interesting at the moment, however, for it points us to a further peculiarity
of the debate over indigenous intellectual property: collective ownership is generally employed as an argument against intellectual property protection, yet collective ownership is generally used to argue for
expanding indigenous intellectual property protection.
If knowledge is not property in a legal sense, then my (or my
group's) right to exclusive use might be justified otherwise, that is, as a
moral rather than a legal claim. As to the efficacy or correctness of
such a moral claim, I also remain agnostic. However, the free-flowing
nature and history of knowledge transfer has, historically, been the
most fundamental attribute of thriving cultures, so it seems, prima facie, hard to justify the moral justifications of cutting off the flow of
knowledge.16

Once I share knowledge or ideas of my own, are they still my own
at all? I likely want credit, and profits if they exist or have the potential to, but to share is also to risk and to enter into a cooperative enterprise with those I share with. Even The King in King Rat
recognized this, which is why he expected to pay Marlowe for sharing
his knowledge.17 If I keep a secret, I don't risk the knowledge being
transmitted to others, but the secrecy also makes it more difficult to
exploit that knowledge because I have no one that can help me, for I
cannot tell them what I have decided to keep a secret. Trade secret
law continues to provide a mechanism for enforcing secrecy among
secret-keepers, in order to reap greater financial benefit, but even in
the case of trade secrets, sharing my knowledge is risky. 8 Although I
may have some remedy for a breach of duty, once the secret is out, it's
typically out forever, and monetary damages will surely (and reasonably) seem inadequate to those harmed. But such is the nature of taking risks in hope of future reward.19
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., DAVID HACKETr FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA passim (1989) (discussing the different ways in which British "folkways" influenced American culture in different ways in different regions).
"Folkways," according to Fischer, are "the normative structure of values, customs and
meanings that exist in any culture." Id. at 7. They "do not arise from the unconscious
...[but are] the conscious instrument of human will and purpose." Id. "Folkways are
constantly in [the] process of creation, even in our own time" and "are communicated
from one generation to the next by many interlocking mechanisms." Id. at 8-9.
17. See Clavell, supra note 1 and following discussion.
18. See WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 354-371 (2003), for an overview of the reasons and circumstances in which trade secrecy is still attractive, given its risks relative
to patent.
19. Id. at 355.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss2/5
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Intellectual property law offers a way to contract for subsequent
use, generally in the absence of specific agreement. In the case of
copyright, the law provides, in effect, a default contract between the
creator and users-a contract that may be altered, as we see in the rise
of alternative licensing programs like Creative Commons 20 and Konomark.2 1 But even the protection of intellectual property does notcannot-control all subsequent use. In recognition of this, fair use,
for example, provides a very large exception to copyright law,2 2 and
trademark use that does not confuse consumers is likewise allowable. 3 In any event, the claim to control knowledge itself is not a claim
that, historically, law has recognized, even though law has progressively included more and more expansive recognition and protection
for specific embodiments of knowledge.
Any instance of existing intellectual property law instantiates the
principle that control of shared knowledge should not be exclusive
and immutable, by providing explicit exceptions to the protection, yet
some aspects of indigenous claims seem to border on such a position.
Take, for instance, claims about the use of religious symbols and practices. While misuse and disrespect of religious elements may be offensive and morally reprehensible, so is lying. Yet no liberal society
offers up a general law against lying. If a lie gives rise to a harm, there
may well be a legal action to redress the harm, but without a harm
there is no legal wrong. 24 What, if anything, makes the claims of indigenous groups different or unique? If secret-keeping shamans fail
and let secrets be known to outsiders, should we treat this differently
than we do commercial trade secrets? While everyone might agree
that fraud, deception, and theft would be actionable, these elements
are not always present in dealing with native groups. So, in what ways
should we think about cases in which everything is on the up and up?
This essay likely raises more questions than it answers, but I do offer the following, somewhat pragmatist, conclusions: (1) patents
should not cover collective knowledge in the first place, because patents, if at all justifiable, should serve only as an incentive to innovate,
not a tool to exploit existing methods; (2) to the extent patents and
other intellectual property protections granted to outsiders do continue to extend over such knowledge, there are methods for (and suc20. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2009).
21. The Konomark Project, http://konomark.org/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
22. However, for a discussion of some of the limitations of current fair use doctrine, see Daniel Austin Green, Gulliver's Trials: A Modest Proposal to Excuse and
Justify Satire, 11CHAP. L. REV. 183 (2007).
23. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (1973).
24. Perjury (i.e. lying under oath) may seem an exception, but even perjury was
traditionally styled as a wrong against the Crown or, later, a self-evident harm to the
state, like being a traitor. Dubious claims, indeed, but at least there was an attempt to
match the act with a harm.
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cess stories of) groups that have been able to take control of and reap
the benefits of their collective knowledge; (3) under the most egre-

gious circumstances, fraud and unfair competition claims may afford
adequate protection outside of intellectual property law; and (4) efforts, such as "defensive publication," to preclude patents because of
"prior art" should be construed liberally to preempt patent eligibility

in specific cases.
THE NATURE OF RIGHTS

We may talk about rights in any context by distinguishing according
to the scope and derivation of different rights, and I shall here borrow
the distinctions and definitions of philosopher Loren Lomasky. z5 We
might thus classify different rights claims as being "basic rights"
(taken to include "natural rights," "human rights," and similar derivations of rights), "moral rights," and "legal rights." 6 Basic rights are
those rights without which a liberal society, or perhaps any notion of
freedom, could exist. Basic rights are those "rights whose scope of
application is maximally broad, that are not the product of explicit
conventional design but antecedent to it."27 Legal rights are the narrowest class of rights with respect to their scope, but are also those
rights which help to ensure enforcement of rights within a society.28
Moral rights fall somewhere in between, "existing in some sort of
complexly symbiotic-or adversary-relation
with legal structures but
29
not simply the product of positive law."
Claims of indigenous intellectual property rights involve claims of
both moral and legal rights, thus it is not surprising to see that the
many advocates talk about both interchangeably or at least without
demarking the differences. In objectively looking at the state of indigenous intellectual property law, however, we should be careful to
make such distinctions, both as a matter of doing things right, and as a
point of strategy. That is, as someone who believes in approaching
complex questions in a systematic way, making small distinctions, analyzing isolated problems, and then starting to fit the pieces together, I
believe this to be the correct approach. Thus to distinguish between
different types of rights and analyzing facts based on those distinctions
is to reason difficult problems deductively, not inductively. More
practically, however, an advocate for or against protection should be
strategic. Legal arguments will win in court while moral arguments
will often fail there. The conclusions I make in this paper reflect a mix
of moral and legal claims but, ultimately, I believe the legal aspects to
25. LOMASKY, supra note 6, at 101.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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be the most urgent, even if the moral claims are of greater importance
to policy discussions in the long run.
In the context of indigenous intellectual property, moral claims include all of those claims that concern the dignity of or respect for native groups, integrity in representation, and arguments centered
around the idea of making amends for past wrongs, among others.
Legal claims related to indigenous intellectual property, by and large,
are those that try to either extend current intellectual property law or
fit indigenous claims within a larger legal context using existing laws
and precedent. Also to be considered legal claims are those arguments which argue for incorporating the laws of native cultures into
the laws of larger societies-that is, arguments for legal pluralism.3"
Although some legal systems may incorporate more or less moral argumentation, the fact that a native culture's jurisprudence is different
does not make it non-lawful, it merely makes for a conflict of laws.
THE NATURE OF PROPERTY

One can think of property in a variety of ways. Traditionally, the
model in the United States has been to structure debates in primarily
Lockean terms. Following Locke, the Anglo-American tradition has
been structured around an argument that property is somehow derivative of our rights to self-ownership. Locke is not original in this aspect
of his thought, but Locke offers a distinctive account of the boundaries of self-ownership that has been extremely influential in this tradition: labor mixing. If I invest-or mix-my labor with something, the
result under the Lockean account is a claim of ownership over that
thing. The things Locke talks about are all tangible, but even with
tangible objects, Locke's argument is not without problems. If I put
up a fence on a parcel of uninhabited land the size of a state, is that a
sufficient mixing of my labor to justify a claim of (exclusive) ownership over this gigantic parcel? Even to Locke, this would fail. The socalled "Lockean Proviso"-to leave "enough, and as good, left in
common for others" 31 -operates to say that no individual can make a
property claim that would be wasteful. Philosopher Robert Nozick
first called this passage the "proviso"32 and went on to describe the
proviso as "a necessary condition for justified appropriation '33 and a
condition "requiring that the situation of others not be worsened by
one's acquisitive behavior., 34 Of course, the scope and meaning of the
30. Danielle Conway-Jones, Address at the Texas Wesleyan Law Review Symposium: Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 24, 2008).
31. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 19 (Hacket Publ'g

Co. 1980) (1690).
32. ROBERT NOZICK,

ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

175 (1974).

33. MOORE,supra note 8, at 73.

34. Id.
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Proviso is highly contested, 35 and Locke's own discussion offers virtually no concrete guidance as to these matters.
Even if one accepts the Lockean story, though, it is not obvious that
it extends to intangible items in full force. Locke certainly offers no
rigorous account of why, much less how, copyright could be justified
by his argument for a labor theory of value. Still, Locke's work has
been embraced especially in the copyright literature and we may at
least, for the purposes of this essay, assume that it provides a plausible, if somewhat lacking, justification for the existence (though perhaps not the scope) of contemporary copyright law. Patented
inventions, too, likely bear a resemblance to the type of labor-mixing
that Locke was describing and thus contemporary Anglo-American
patent law can be said to have a similar, if imperfect, grounding in
Locke.
Locke starts his discussion of property with the ontological question: from where do these rights derive? Utilitarianism has also been
very influential, but utilitarianism, in any formulation, relies on some
notion of welfare maximization, thus need not have a theory about the
nature and origin of rights in the same way that other, non-utilitarian
theories do. Locke defends the notion of self-ownership, and goes to
great lengths to derive his account of property by starting with a defense of the idea of self-ownership. Property, then, is in some sense
part of the self; claims to property are really claims to the extension of
the self. Property is part of personhood. Personhood, however,
brings us also to a rather different account of the justification of property, though one still rooted in self-ownership: Hegel.
Hegel's account of property as personhood36 has certainly not gone
unnoticed since its writing and, though often neglected in the legal
literature, the Hegelian account of property is certainly not unknown
to discussions of intellectual property.37 Jeremy Waldron has defended the Hegelian conception of property, even while wrestling with
what he perceives to be its flaws, concluding that "Hegel's account of
property in the Philosophy of Right provides us with the best example
we have of a sustained argument in favor of private ownership which
is GR [general right]-based."3 Further, Margaret Jane Radin has
made a sustained effort to incorporate the Hegelian justification of

35. See, for example, id. at 71-97 for a reinterpretation of Locke's account of original acquisition that incorporates elements of both Robert Nozick's and David
Guathier's interpretations of Locke.
36. See generally G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
§§ 41-53 (Allen W. Wood, ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821).
37. For an excellent overview of this and many other general philosophic questions about the nature of intellectual property, see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287 (1988).
38. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 343 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss2/5
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property into the literature on intellectual property law.3 9 Radin introduces her project as an "attempt[ ] to clarify a third strand of liberal property theory that focuses on personal embodiment or selfconstitution in terms of 'things."' 4 0 "Both lines of argument hold that
individuals have an interest in owning things which is important
enough to command respect and to constrain political action."4 1 Still,
the Hegelian project, too, rests on self-ownership-the individual, not
the community, is the locus for grounding a right to property. But we
might envision building on the Hegelian claim, and more easily make
the link from personhood to community than if we stick so firmly with
the Lockean idea. To Hegel, property is a "basic human interest
which everyone has" while Locke sees the justification for property
''on account of what they happen to have done or what has happened
to them."4 2 The Hegelian claim is one of value in identity, not a labor
theory of value. It is likely easier to move from discussing a person's
identity to the collective identity of a group of persons than it is to
move from a labor theory of value to a collective labor theory of value.
In many native cultures, however, claims rooted in self-ownership
may be less convincing, for it is brought to our attention that rights do
not always attach to the individual in the same fashion as the western
European and Anglo-American traditions.4 3 That is, groups may collectively exert a type of property claim, even while exercising no privilege or parceling of that property within members of the community.4 4
While we should consider these cultures to have a notion of property-insofar as they exclude non-members from use or access-this
notion is very different from the property regime that many governments now impose.
Radin acknowledges the individualistic ideas of most theories of
personhood and describes the relationship between individualist and
communitarian ideas thusly:
A communitarian would find all of those concepts of personhood
wrongheaded because they all derive from the individualistic worldview that flowered in western society with the industrial revolution.
In a society in which the only human entity recognized in a social
intercourse is some aggregate like the family or clan, there could
39. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.

957 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood];MARGARET
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY

REV.
JANE RADIN,

(1993) [hereinafter Radin, REINTERPRETING

PROPERTY]

(including a reprinting of Property and Personhood and other chapters that integrate
this idea into a more comprehensive theory of property in all of its contexts).
40. Radin, Property and Personhood,supra note 39, at 958.

41.

WALDRON,

supra note 38, at 3.

42. Id.
43. See generally MICHAEL F.
DARRELL A.

BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE?

(2003);

POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

WARD TRADITIONAL

COMMUNITIES

RESOURCE RIGHTS

FOR

INDIGENOUS

PEOPLES AND

To-

LOCAL

(1996), available at http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/799-x/.

44. Id.
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not be such intense philosophical attention to the biological individual and its ontological, psychological, moral and political status. In
view of individualistic roots of those theories of the person, it comes
as no surprise that thinkers who wish to progress from an individualist to a communitarian world-view are impatient with them. Communitarians see the myth of the self-contained "man" in a state of
nature as politically misleading and dangerous. Persons are embedded in language, history, and culture, which are social creations;
there can be no such thing as a person without society.
For the sake of simplicity, I shall initially confine my inquiry to
the types of the person posited by the more traditional, individualoriented theories. But the communitarian critique reminds us that
the idea of the person in the abstract should not be pushed beyond
its usefulness. In what follows, I shall attempt to pay attention to
the role ofgroups
both as constituted by persons and as constitutive
of persons. 4
Radin's framing of the various theories of the person bears an obvious relevance to the discussion of indigenous intellectual property, despite it not being a subject Radin has particularly addressed in her
theory of property and personhood. However, it is especially important to take seriously the last of the portion here excerpted: that
groups are both made up of individuals, and that individuals are themselves defined or determined by the identity of the group(s) to which
they belong.4 6 That is, as Radin suggests, even an individualist account of the person need not reject the centrality of groups. The fact
that we can recognize an individual, and construct a theory of property that begins with self-ownership, is not inherently at odds with also
recognizing the claims that groups have over individuals.
What, then, are we to make of this type of supposed conflict about
the very meaning or essence of property? Isn't a justification of property centered around group, instead of individual, rights just as valid
as one that starts with self-ownership?
First, it is not necessary that a concept of group rights depends on a
refutation of individual rights and, particularly, of self-ownership.
Self-determination is generally considered a group right-the right of
a tribal group to decide for itself questions that affect the polity. Yet
self-determination certainly does not exclude self-ownership by the individual, who is surely not simply a fungible piece of a collective body
in cultures asserting group ownership. We should be alarmed if our
arguments about indigenous peoples begin to sound as if we are talking about a collective actor, or a homogenous group acting in concert,
instead of a community of autonomous moral agents whose individual
views, notwithstanding common interests, may sometimes (or perhaps
often) diverge and conflict. Concern for a group should not make us
45. Radin, supra note 40, at 964-65 (emphasis added).
46. See id.
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lose sight of the autonomous moral agency of each individual member. Moreover, individuals have a right of self-determination or selfgovernance in the same way that groups do. Although tribal organizational structures vary significantly, there is often deliberation and conflict within tribes-the consequence of individual opinions and values.
When talking about policy, then, we should be very careful to anticipate the dynamics of intra-group conflicts and politics. While we cannot solve these problems, or even presume to accurately predict them,
we must be careful not to undermine self-determination by empowering particular subgroups of a culture.
Moreover, Rawlsian considerations of intergenerational justice further emphasize the importance of not advantaging individual members or factions of a group.47
The appropriate expectation in applying the difference principle is
that of the long-term prospects of the least favored extending over
future generations. Each generation must not only preserve the
gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in each
period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation. 48
Political and legal decisions have consequences and, because of their
relative permanence, these consequences often affect later generations even more than those alive at the time of enactment. Privileging
a particular faction today will advantage their heirs in the future, and
it is important to question the appropriateness of outside or larger
society creating rules that will potentially advantage some-and, correlatively, disadvantage other-members of a group. Past wrongs also
raise intergenerational concerns, but we should be careful not to interfere with internal structures or rivalries within the polities of native
peoples. Creating additional claims may be less helpful or justifiable
than direct payment of reparations.
Self-determination-the right of individuals and groups to make for
themselves the decisions that affect their future-is an important issue
for native groups. It is a right that many groups have, historically,
been denied. But, in the name of self-determination, we should not
forsake the right of the individual for the supposed good of the group,
or at least not do so without making explicit that that is what we are
doing and that we intend that effect.
Similarly, further consideration is also due to those ostracized or
outcast by native groups, and allowing them to still use and identify
with aspects of their own native culture. If a member of a group finds
their membership terminated-with or without cause, according to
47. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 44 (1971) (rev. ed. 1990). "We
must now consider the question of justice between generations. There is no need to
stress the difficulties that this problem raises. It subjects any ethical theory to severe
if not impossible tests." Id. at 251.
48. Id. at 252.
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the definition or determination of the group-does this individual
have any claim to the group's indigenous intellectual property? Why
or why not? What about the children of people parented by only one
member of the group? Are they not to have any claim to the group?
Is it possible that indigenous intellectual property, if taken to certain
extremes, could lead to pressures from within some group to maintain
"purity"? The definition of the group itself can be an issue and we
should not interfere with a group's capacity to define-or disagree
over-its very constitution.
There is a certain danger always to be avoided when talking about
the rights of collective bodies, be they legislatures, native groups, corporations, or even whole nations. If we do not construct group rights
as derivative of, coextensive with, or in some way complimentary to
individual rights, then we run the risk of undermining the very basis
for the idea that every human is an individual and equal member of
the moral community, 49 and that no person has any inherent authority
over another.50 To say this is not to say that group rights are not
unique or that they are simply an aggregation of individual claims.
Even "property for personhood" runs some risk of "collaps[ing] to a
simple utilitarian preference summing" if we do not also make objective criteria to distinguish things that do and do not properly constitute property contributing to personhood or identity.5 1
I do not dismiss the proposition that groups may have particular
and perhaps even stronger claims of rights in some specific situations.
The danger I want to avoid, however, is to shift the genesis of our
claims to moral rights from the individual to the group-a decidedly
illiberal move that leads, in the extreme, to rationalizations from the
most destructive and oppressive regimes in which groups try to dominate or even exterminate one another.
The danger of basing every claim as a group right is especially clear
in the context of certain indigenous claims: "when heritage-protection
laws move in an emotivist direction by aiming to protect the feelings
of native populations from every possible indignity, they travel down a
dangerous road-one that, among other things, invites similar demands from groups whose goals and values may be distasteful or destructive."5 " We must be mindful of the general applicability of law
and remember that a law intended to (rightly) help one or more
groups might be used by others in ways in which we have neither foreseen nor approved of, even while keeping mindful of the possibility
49. See generally LOMASKY,supra note 6, at 161, for an extended description of
what it means to be an individual member of a "moral community."
50. See generally WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON MODERN MORALS AND MANNERS (1793) (attacking conventional justifications used to exert power over other individuals).
51. Radin, Property and Personhood,supra note 39, at 961.
52. BROWN, supra note 43, at 196.
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that the potential for misuse might be less-or worse-than our ex
ante hypotheticals. Law is a powerful tool for social reform, but in its
power lies also its danger.
Rights, regardless of their nature or context, exist as a claim against
others. The type of claim embodied in a right is only valuable insofar
as it can actually be enforced against those obstructing it. We may
rely on our own resources to enforce our rights, as in the case of selfdefense, or on a third party, such as the military or police. Ultimately,
though, the value of the right is inextricably bound up with its enforceability. Perhaps even the very definition of a right depends on its
enforcement.
To say that I have a right to walk down the sidewalk is of little value
unless I attempt to do so. In a weak sense I exercise this right when I
actually do walk down the sidewalk, but it is only when I am opposed
in my effort to do so that I truly see or experience the force and value
of the right. If the sidewalk is blocked and I am told to turn around
and go home, and I do so because I am intimidated by the bully standing in my way, then of what value is my "right"? If, however, I call
over the police officer standing on the corner, and the police officer
arrests the bully, then I have seen something of the strength and scope
of my right to walk down the sidewalk.
Of course, even in this simple example, there is more than one alleged right at issue: I am claiming a "right to walk down the sidewalk," but I would also claim a right to be free from harm (and threat
thereof). It is not clear, then, which of these rights, or both, the police
officer is enforcing, or believes to be enforcing, or to what degree.
The outcome is clear (and correct), but the reasoning is still uncertain.
As rights are repeatedly and consistently enforced in a society (or
not), we may gain a fuller sense of what a specific right's content actually is. Yet, even agreement that a particular right exists does not
render self-evident the scope, limits, or even complete definition of
the right.
Perhaps the most fundamental question about the group of rights
this symposium is forcing us to consider is one of the very nature of
the rights under consideration: is there implicated here a right to
property or a broader right to the control and exclusivity of knowledge itself? Are we sometimes confusing these two very different
claims? Largely, the debate has been structured around a presumption that it is the former, a right to property, that has been at stake.
This, however, may itself be a product of Western philosophical import and dominance and the influence of, primarily, Locke, but also of
Hegel.
Although it is unfair and disrespectful to talk of all native peoples
as one group, with common beliefs, as is often done, it is important to
note that at least some (and perhaps many) native groups may in fact
view "all products of the human mind and heart as interrelated, and as
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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flowing from the same source: the relationships between the people
and their land, their kinship with other living creatures that share the
land and with the spiritual world. . . All elements of heritage should
be managed and protected as a single, interrelated and integrated
whole. '5 3 But property is not a concept of inflexibility; property is a
method of recognizing rules about possession and control of land,
things, and certain intangibles. An "interrelated and integrated
whole" 54 encompassing "all elements of heritage" 5 and allowing absolute control over their use is, however, something much more than a
claim to property.
Property implicates many aspects of ownership-exclusivity and
control often among them-but property is best thought of as a bundle of rights, 56 not as a monolithic distribution of absolute control.
The Anglo-American conception of property is a bundle of rights that
are rather homogenous across the various types of objects it applies
to, yet the specific composition of the bundle of rights we call property
may vary across times, places, objects, and cultures.
Many native cultures long had robust systems of property rights,
although those systems were very different from Western conceptions
of what it meant to have property. In fact:
Most, albeit not all, modern treatises on indigenous economic and
entrepreneurial development assume, or at least argue, that there
are several inherent characteristics of these native populations that
make them unique and at odds with the European-based cultures
that ultimately dominated the landscape. The most often cited
characteristics suggest that indigenous populations are fundamentally more collective in their societal activities, they historically have
a different sense of private property ownership, and their desire to
enjoy economic development is essentially subordinated to a more
"harmonious" relationship with nature.
[But] many of these often cited economic characteristics are the
result of an artificial nineteenth-century "collective" land tenure system and a twentieth-century "romantic image". . . [which] cloud not
only our ability to properly understand the well-documented low
incidence of self-employment and entrepreneurial activity among
modern indigenous populations, but also our societal efforts to create the mechanisms capable of remedying this situation.5 7
53. BROWN, supra note 43, at 211 (quoting U.N. ECON. & Soc. COUNCIL
[ECOSOC], PROTECTION OF THE HERITAGE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE at 3-4, U.N.
Sales No. E.97.XIV.3 (1997) (prepared by Erica-Irene Daes) [herinafter Protection of
Heritage]).
54. Id. (quoting Protection of Heritage, supra note 54).
55. Id. (quoting Protection of Heritage, supra note 54).
56. Demsetz, supra note 7, at 347.
57. Craig S. Galbraith, Carlos L. Rodriguez, and Curt H. Stiles, False Myths and
Indigenous EntrepreneurialStrategies, in SELF-DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss2/5
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Past wrongs that disrespected and often disregarded those notions of
property should not give rise to allowing property to be redefined in a
way that give native peoples a unique claim over the control of collective knowledge, even while protecting and integrating traditional native ideas about the nature of property. Respecting native cultures
need not compel us to immunize them from offense, verbal attack,
distortion, or disrespecting misuse of religious symbols-these are important concerns, but they are not part of property. No doubt many
religious groups would have liked to have had the right to control the
use of religious symbols in countless instances over centuries, from
artistic installations to schisms within their own ranks, but such a right
to control iconography implicates far more than liberal societies have
regarded as a property right, however robustly property was defined.
On the other hand, we should directly confront this stronger claim if
it is in fact being made in discussions of indigenous intellectual property. If calling for intangible cultural heritage property protection is
ultimately a claim to control that knowledge, including both its use
and wider dissemination, then what is at stake is not property at all,
but information control. If property is in fact completely foreign to
some native cultures, and all elements of heritage are part of one
whole, this is a much broader, and indeed rather different, claim than
one of property. This is a dubious claim, rebutted by many historical
studies,5" but, more importantly to the present inquiry, not really one
of property at all. It smacks more of a right to privacy than one of
property. And, since it is about a group's claim, it is also a collective
right. Can there be such a thing as collective or group privacy, or is
some loss of privacy the cost of forming groups?
Returning to the property-based claim, it is important that we recognize that the term "property" can refer to many different notions of
ownership or control.59 Taking into account different perspectives of
what it means to have property is important, thus incorporating native
groups' notions of property is necessary to having a fair discussion
about how to deal with conflicts over property. In the United States,
the government unjustly failed to recognize existing structures, conceptions, and claims of property, largely to real property, among many
native peoples.
Intellectual property itself is not an uncontested idea to start with
-many object to its breadth or even its existence. 60 Intellectual property extends the idea of property into the abstract-into the world of
knowledge and ideas. When we talk of the idea/expression dichotomy
4, 5 (Terry L. Anderson, Bruce L. Benson, and Thomas E.
Flanagan eds. 2006).
58. Id. at 6-7.
59. Id. at 6-12.
60. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property:A Non-PosnerianLaw and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 266 (1989).
FOR NATIVE AMERICANS
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in copyright,6 1 and maintain that only the expression, not the underlying idea, is protected, we are not making a false claim. At the same
time, though, the protection of copyright is protecting something far
closer to an idea or knowledge than protecting something like a lot of
land or a chattel. When we extend our notion of intellectual property
to include more and more elements of culture, however important
they are, we are getting further and further from the notion of
property.
Paradoxically, some arguments about indigenous intellectual property both reject property in the Western sense, yet essentially advocate the expansion of Western property law in a wholly
unprecedented way, allowing for absolute and exclusive control, with
no time limit.
FORMS OF REMEDIES

All of this grand theory of indigenous intellectual property rights
and their philosophical foundations should not obfuscate the central
concern of protecting native cultures, even though I strongly believe
we should take such philosophical matters into account. Discussion of
the nature of rights should instead remind us that many different interests are at stake in these matters. In various contexts, different indigenous groups have better and worse arguments, and the same can
be said of the groups they oppose. In some cases, neither seem to
have a very good claim.
Should anyone really be declared to have an intellectual property
right to bits of genetics embodied in their person? Neither pharmaceutical companies discovering such genetic coding, nor the individual
with the unwitting possessory interest have particularly strong arguments. When further work is done to develop the insight into a drug,
then the pharmaceutical company has made an investment, but it is
not clear that such discoveries (even if later refined) are quite the
same as an invention. That is, there seems to be a difference even
between allowing the pharmaceutical company to profit from this
work and granting a patent that will allow them to receive monopoly
(i.e. excess) profits from the venture. If the individual giving, say, a
blood sample or DNA swab was aware of this potential profit to the
pharmaceutical company, then it seems reasonable to possibly infer
that they consented. However, it is often, at best, unclear as to how
much disclosure was made, and often obvious there was none.
But if someone is duped into consenting to do something that results in the other party's windfall, is this anything more than fraud in
the inducement? Can we not simply rely on traditional legal remedies? Moreover, expanding the application of fraud to cover such
61. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539 (1985).
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cases of misuse or unfair use of knowledge obtained from indigenous
peoples integrates such claims into a larger body of law. This would in
turn serve to strengthen the claim, by suggesting it is merely a new
instance of an old problem with an old remedy, and also offer precedent for expanding fraud claims in other cases of asymmetrical knowledge between the parties to a transaction. This both supports
indigenous claims and furthers the doctrine of common law fraud.
Claims to protect against profiting from the misappropriation of
knowledge should be distinguished from claims to protect against unsavory or disrespectful usages or invocations. The former are claims
consistent with law around the world, while the latter are moral claims
that, while possible to contest, butt against the state of law in most
liberal societies. Using a religious symbol of a native group is a matter
of morality and respect, but also, to the dissident, iconoclast, or reformer, a right of speech. Such claims are well worth addressing, but
it is hard to see them as entirely grounded in property, if at all.
Returning to what I take to the domain of property law, however, I
offer up the following four suggestions, the first two of which are oriented more towards policy and moral philosophical considerations,
with the latter two being more pragmatic and legal in nature:
(1) Patents should not cover existing collective knowledge in the
first place, for native groups or corporate entities, because patents, if
at all justifiable, should serve only as an incentive to innovate, not a
tool to exploit existing methods and practices. Patents are, unlike
copyright and trademark, not concerned with source designation so
much as they are in securing an outright monopoly, without the exceptions that copyright and trademark allow for. Dispersed knowledge
should not be allowed to be monopolized for the benefit of an entity
that did not create the idea. That is, even native groups today should
not be given a patent monopoly for knowledge that they inherited, but
neither should, for instance, pharmaceutical companies who discover
an ancient remedy, by virtue of reaching the patent office first.
(2) To the extent patents continue to extend over such knowledge, it
is possible for groups to take control of and reap the benefits of their
collective knowledge through patenting, licensing, and other methods
of exploiting their natural comparative advantage. Even without patent law, trademark (which has no time horizon) would protect source
designation for groups that wanted to take advantage of their knowledge and crafts, for example, by designating official or authentic
goods and services, offered either directly or by license.6 2
For chemical or process derivations of discoveries (e.g. where the
pharmaceutical company creates a more stable or reliable simulated
62. Doris Long, Address at the Texas Wesleyan Law Review Symposium: Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 24, 2008) (discussing the success of this
with Molas San Bias and others).
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compound), compulsory licensing might offer some compromise.
Some form of compulsory licensing could serve, much like copyright
law, as a default contract, allowing terms to be altered by mutual consent. Pharmaceutical companies might use native knowledge as a
source for derivative processes and, in turn, be required to pay back to
that group some portion of their profits from the patent ultimately
received. Such a system would not be easy to administer, and would
likely raise additional questions about fairness in the distribution of
payments within the native groups. However, given the unlikelihood
of my first solution gaining support, and recognition of the additional
work by the pharmaceutical companies involved in this type of scenario, it serves as a rather pragmatic solution to competing interests.
(3) Under the most egregious circumstances, fraud, unfair competition, and other common law claims may afford adequate and far less
controversial and less expansive protection outside of intellectual
property law. Must we create additional laws when there exists an
adequate path to a remedy? Incorporating conventional legal actions
into legal strategies for native groups not only offers them existing
means to recovery, but it strengthens the context of these actions
themselves.
The essence of common law is its evolution and extension across
contexts. Having a broader range of context for fraud and unfair competition claims not only offers immediate help to those raising the
claims, but also aids in the development of those doctrines in a larger
sense. We should rely on existing legal causes of action to the fullest
extent possible to bring equitable solutions to the parties involved,
and this applies equally to those wanting, in a more general vein,
greater or lesser intellectual property protections than the law currently provides.
(4) Efforts, such as "defensive publication,"63 to preclude patents
because of "prior art" should be construed liberally to preempt patent
eligibility in specific cases. If anyone does or should have a right in
these things, it should be the native people, although I remain skeptical about propertizing collective knowledge for which there was no
effort to keep secret. While defensive publication also precludes the
native groups themselves from obtaining patents, I do not find this
result particularly troubling. Moreover, even with defensive publication, groups have only ceded temporary patent protections, not the
indefinite protections related to source designation that trademark law
offers if the groups decide that they want to market or license the
product of their knowledge.
63. For a description of and argument in favor of the practice see Stephen Adams
& Victoria Henson-Apollonio, Defensive Publishing: a Strategy for MaintainingIntellectual Propertyas Public Goods, Int'l Serv. for Nat'l Agric. Res., Briefing Paper No.
53 (2002), http://pdf.dec.org/pdf.docs/PNACS088.pdf.
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CONCLUSION

Creating sui generis intellectual property protections for indigenous
knowledge is an ill-fitted and incomplete remedy to past wrongs committed against native peoples by many governments because the remedy fails to match the harm, either in type or magnitude. Issues of
sovereignty, authority, and abuse of power are simply too grave to be
"made up for" by intellectual property law, thus we should focus our
discussion about protection for indigenous knowledge around the nature of the claim, not past wrongdoing. That is not to diminish or
ignore the seriousness of discussion about what can and should be
done to rectify such wrongs, but merely to say that these should be
distinct dialogues.
If we focus on the nature of claims to protect indigenous knowledge, we face the following question: is this a new type of right altogether, or simply an extension of intellectual property as we
understand it? In either case, we should keep in mind the justifications for any intellectual property protection and also ask ourselves in
what ways claims by indigenous groups may be different, and if these
differences justify altered conclusions. I remain skeptical about the
current breadth of all intellectual property, so either expanding such
rights or creating additional, similar rights specifically for indigenous
knowledge will, I admit, face the utmost scrutiny from me.
However, what I have tried to do in this essay is to outline some
objections to indigenous intellectual property on the grounds that
such claims really entail a sort of protection of information which even
those who want such a right concede does not exist under U.S. law.64
These preliminary objections of mine may be overcome, but I believe
they are important considerations in the debate.
Beyond my critical skepticism, however, I have endeavored to show
that there are avenues, within and outside intellectual property law,
by which indigenous peoples may effectively help themselves without
further expansion or change to the law. By taking advantage of intellectual property law, many groups may be able to reap the benefits of
their knowledge by choosing to market their knowledge either directly
or through intermediaries. At a minimum, some aspects of intellectual property law, such as pre-emptive publication under patent law,
may at least prevent outsiders from exploiting native peoples' knowledge for profit. Existing common law, commercial law, and unfair
competition law remedies may also allow for recovery in the case of
specific wrongs, such as fraud, unfair dealings, or passing-off.
More generally, it is important for the United States and other nations to consider the incorporation of customary law. In many cases
native law is not codified, but incorporation of native groups' customary law offers promise to resolving conflicts over the use of indigenous
64. See MooRE, supra note 8.
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knowledge, as Danielle Conway-Jones discusses in this symposium. 65
Such incorporation is perhaps not easy to do, but it may offer remedy
without creating additional law, by merely respecting and integrating
native law. This path likely faces many problems as well, but it is certainly worth further consideration and implementation.
Related to pluralism, but much more general, is the idea of selfdetermination. Respecting the autonomy of individuals and groups
must also imply the incorporation of their laws, even if they are customary instead of codified, into the larger political bodies in which
they reside, instead of stripping them of all political and legal power.
Another aspect of self-determination, however, urges us to not force
integration, but to take a stance of non-interference. Thus, one side of
self-determination compels us to incorporate elements of native culture, but another side of this same political value compels us to be
hands-off in our dealings with native groups. This can be a delicate
balancing act, but nations should deal with native groups with both
aspects of self-determination in mind.
This essay highlights various concerns, from philosophical questions
to practical steps that could be taken, in the dealings of national legal
regimes with indigenous cultures. My purpose has not been to settle
any issues in the debate, but more to raise questions - questions that
might inform the terms of the debate over indigenous intellectual
property, both in its efficacy and in its broader justifications.
65. Danielle Conway-Jones, Address at the Texas Wesleyan Law Review Symposium: Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 24, 2008).
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